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MOLINISM AND THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT:
A CHALLENGE
Kenneth J. Perszyk

The main aim of this paper is to investigate the structural similarities between
the Consequence Argument and anti-Molinist arguments and the standard
compatibilist and Molinist replies, respectively, to them. Friends and foes of
divine middle knowledge have assumed that libertarianism is an essential
component of Molinism. Can Molinists consistently embrace the Consequence
Argument against compatibilism? It's difficult to see that they can.

Philosophers have recognized parallels between arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge with our freedom to do otherwise and
the Consequence Argument for the incompatibility of determinism with
our freedom to do otherwise.! What, surprisingly, appears to have gone
unnoticed is the extent to which these arguments are similar to antiMolinist arguments for the impossibility of God having middle knowledge
of our free actions. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the structural similarities between the Consequence Argument and anti-Molinist arguments and the standard compatibilist and Molinist replies, respectively, to
them. 2 It is arguable that anyone who accepts the Consequence Argument
should be an anti-Molinist, and conversely, that anyone who endorses
Molinism should reject the Consequence Argument. Yet Molinists typically
think the Consequence Argument is sound. 3
This need not be inconsistent. One could say that there are sound
Consequence Arguments and there are unsound ones. Perhaps some (even
most, if not all) current versions are unsound because they rely on an
invalid inference rule, which turns out to be the same inference rule at work
in these anti-Molinist arguments. A Molinist might still think or hope that
there is a sound Consequence Argument somewhere in the neighbourhood.
Nevertheless, I think there is something deeply puzzling going on here.
Suppose we come up with what appears to be a sound Consequence
Argument. Why think that we will not be able to construct a sound antiMolinist argument by plugging it into the same schema? At least we will
get validity if we have the right inference rule(s). The difference would
then have to come down to the truth of the premisses, accepting them in
the case of the Consequence Argument but denying at least one in the case
of anti-Molinist arguments. As we shall see, Molinists face the challenge of
trying to provide a plausible basis for doing this:
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Foes and friends of middle knowledge have assumed that libertarianism
is an essential component of Molinism. 5 Contemporary libertarian foes typically argue that God's middle knowledge is incompatible with our freedom, and so they conclude that Molinism is incoherent. Molinists are really
compatibilists in sheep's dress. If a Molinist does or must reject the
Consequence Argument, this would not by itself seem to show that she is a
compatibilist. Rejecting the Consequence Argument may be a necessary
condition for being a compatibilist (at least for those compatibilists who
think that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise), but it is not sufficient. In addition, accepting the Consequence Argument is arguably not a
necessary condition for being a libertarian, though it or something very
close to it has long been one of the favourite weapons in the libertarian's
arsenal. Nevertheless, I think Molinists would feel deeply uncomfortable if
it were reasonable to believe that they should reject the Consequence
Argument. For example, parallel arguments for the incompatibility of
determinism with moral responsibility, which Molinists have accepted,
would also collapse.

The Consequence Argument
Compatibilism, minimally defined, is the thesis that freedom is possible
under determinism. Determinism is the thesis that, given the conjunction
of the past and laws of nature, only one future is possible. Libertarianism,
minimally defined, is incompatibilism - i.e. the denial of compatibilism as
just defined - together with the thesis that some of our actions are free, and
so determinism is false.
In his book An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen presents what he
dubs the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the deductive consequences
of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But is it not up to
us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what
the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things
(including our present acts) are not up to us. 6

Van Inwagen goes on to give three detailed versions of the Argument. His
third version is a modal argument which uses a primitive one-place propositional operator N to denote a species of alethic necessity.7 Let "Np" abbreviate lip and no one (i.e. no human being) has or ever had a choice about
whether p", and understand one's having no choice about a truth p as one's
being unable to act so as to render p false. This technical locution is supposed to capture the ordinary notion of a person's being unable to do otherwise in the circumstances, and so (on the supposition that being able to
do otherwise is a necessary condition for freedom) lacking freedom with
respect to the performance of one's action. Van Inwagen gives two inference rules governing the logic of his N-operator:
Rule Alpha: D p::J Np (where D expresses broadly logical necessity), and
Rule Beta: (Np A N(p::J q))::J Nq.
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Now, let "H" abbreviate the conjunction of the true propositions which
completely describe the state of the world at some time in the remote past,
let ilL" abbreviate the conjunction of the laws of nature, and let "P" stand
for any truth. The (third version of the) Consequence Argument runs as
follows:
1. D «H A L) ::::) P)
2. D (H ::::) (L ::::) P))
3. N (H ::::) (L ::::) P))

4.
5.
6.
7.

NH
N (L ::::)P)
NL
NP

Consequence of Determinism
1
2, Alpha
Fixity of the past
3,4 Beta
Fixity of the laws
5,6 Beta

If determinism is true, no one has or ever had a choice about any true
proposition, including those which describe our apparently free actions. If
the Consequence Argument is sound, determinism and freedom to do otherwise are incompatible.
Since everyone agrees that line 1 is true, and no one seems to dispute the
validity of Alpha, if we replace lines 4 and 6 above with the formally
stronger premiss N (H A L), we get the following simplified version of the
Argument:
1. N «H A L) ::::) P)
2. N (H A L)
3.NP

The soundness of the Argument relies on the validity of Beta and the truth
of the fixity of the past and laws premiss. For Beta to be invalid, it must be
possible for happenings under our control (viz. our free actions) to be the
deductive consequences of conditions (events, states of affairs, etc.) not
under our control. Of course, this is just what compatibilists think is possible, and so it is not surprising that they reject Beta.8
To be more precise, they reject Beta on a certain interpretation of what it
means to have no choice about a truth p or to be unable to render p false.
Compatibilists distinguish a strong from a weak reading of these terms of
art. 9 For example, on a strong reading, I cannot render a proposition p false
if and only if p is true and there is nothing I can do such that, if I did it, P
would have been falsified by my act itself or by some event caused by it.
On a weak reading, I cannot render a proposition p false if and only if p is
true and there is nothing I can do such that, if I did it, P would have been
falsified, though not by my act itself or by some event caused by it. This
distinction amounts to a distinction between lacking causal power over a
truth p and lacking counterfactual power over p.
On the strong reading of van Inwagen's N-operator, compatibilists
admit that we have no causal power over (remote) past events or laws of
nature. There is nothing we can do such that, if we did it, our act itself
would either be or cause a past-altering or law-breaking event. In this
sense, compatibilists accept the fixity of the past and laws premiss. But
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from this they say it does not follow that our free actions cannot be (causally) necessitated by the conjunction of (remote) past events and laws of
nature. Compatibilists deny the validity of Beta on the strong reading of
van Inwagen's N-operator. If, on the other hand, we use the weak reading,
compatibilists admit (indeed they must) that Beta is valid. But then they
deny the soundness of the Argument by denying that the past and laws of
nature are not "up to us" in that sense. We do, they say, have counterfactual power over either the (remote) past or the laws.lO

The Molinist account of providence
The Molinist account of providence is built upon a commitment to (1) the
strong account of providence affirmed by many Christians throughout the
centuries, and (2) a strong libertarian account of creaturely freedomY The
former entails the thesis, put roughly, that everything that happens in the
world is "specifically" intended or permitted by God. God's providence is
not restricted to having general plans or strategies for the world and its
inhabitants. Nothing that occurs can take him by surprise, and so there is
no need to have contingency plans up his sleeve "just in case". On this
account, God exercises complete control over, and has complete and certain foreknowledge of, every event that actually occurs. In addition, God's
foreknowledge is in some sense dependent on, and even follows from, his
complete control.
Trying to combine the strong account of providence and a libertarian
account of creaturely freedom appears difficult, if not impossible. It seems
that the stronger one's account of divine providence is, the harder it will be
to preserve our libertarian freedom; and correspondingly, the stronger
one's account of libertarian freedom is, the weaker will be one's account of
providence. So, if God has complete control over everything that actually
happens, how could there be any libertarianly free creatures, especially in
the strong sense? Conversely, if there are any such creatures, how could
God have complete control over everything that happens?
Molinists think that the two accounts can be reconciled by, and in fact
together entail, the notion of middle knowledge. If any of our actions are
libertarianly free, the circumstances in which we so act, circumstances
which include the sum total of God's activity up to and including the time
of our actions, cannot determine those actions. Our (freely) doing and our
(freely) refraining from doing the actions in question are each compatible
with the complete circumstances in which we act. But in that case, how is
God able to know what he is doing in creating a world containing libertarianly free creatures, and so know with certainty which such world will be
actual, and at the same time be able to exercise complete control over it?
Answer: He must possess middle knowledge and make free decisions in
the light of it.
Middle knowledge stands between God's so-called natural and free
knowledge. The truths God knows by natural knowledge are necessary and
independent of his will. The truths God knows by free knowledge are contingent and dependent on his will. The truths God knows by middle knowledge are contingent but independent of his will. Among the objects of mid-
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dIe knowledge are so-called counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, i.e. conditional propositions stating with respect to one or more free creatures God
might create what each would do if placed in any possible situation in which
they were left free. God uses these conditionals in his deliberative reasoning
prior to his actualization of a world. By natural knowledge, he knows which
worlds are logically possible. By middle knowledge, he knows which possible worlds are open to him. Since he has no control over the truth-values of
the objects of middle knowledge, it is not up to him which worlds are open
to him. Nevertheless, which of the worlds open to him is actual is entirely
up to him. Since he knows by middle knowledge what each creature he
might create would freely do in any possible situation, he knows what he
has to do to get the world from within the set open to him that he wants. By
deciding which complete creative act to perform, he decides which world
open to him is actual. In this way, middle knowledge allegedly allows us to
explain, and indeed appears to be the only plausible explanation of, just
how it is that God's good plan for creation can be guaranteed to succeed if it
includes libertarianly free creatures. And since God's foreknowledge follows from middle knowledge and knowledge of his free decrees, Molinism
also allegedly explains just how it is that God has always had complete and
certain foreknowledge of the actual world. And so, armed with middle
knowledge God can exercise complete and specific sovereignty over creation and have complete and certain foreknowledge of everything that happens in it, while at the same preserving our libertarian freedom.12

Anti-Molinist Arguments
Arguments against the possibility of middle knowledge often rely on socalled Power Entailment Principles (PEPs).13 For anti-Molinists, the main
aim of trying to formulate an adequate PEP is to show that middle knowledge is freedom-cancelling. PEPs purport to identify necessary conditions
for an agent's having the power to do something. For example, if an agent
S can at t render p true (and q is false), and p entails q, then S can at t render
q true. An equivalent principle is: if S can at t render q false (and p is true),
and p entails q, then S can at t render p false. And this is equivalent to: if S
cannot at t render p false (and p is true), and p entails q, then S cannot at t
render q false. In other words, anti-Molinist arguments often rely on a closure principle to the effect that if an agent is powerless with respect to a
proposition, in the sense that the proposition is true and the agent now has
or never had any choice about it, and that proposition entails another, the
agent is also now powerless over it. Powerlessness is closed under logical
implication. 14 Assuming that no one can render a logical entailment false,
what we end up with here is an agent- and time-indexed version of van
Inwagen's rule Beta. lS Accordingly, these anti-Molinist arguments can be
seen to have the same logical structure as the simplified version of the
Consequence Argument:
1.
2.
3.

N

(((aD~~) 1\

N
N

((aD~~)
~.17

1\

a) :J 13)16
a)
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Consider, e.g., the following implication: If Peter had the chance, he
would (freely) deny Jesus. Peter has the chance. Therefore, Peter (freely)
denies Jesus. By hypothesis, Peter freely denies Jesus. It is hard to imagine
that Peter has or ever had any choice about whether he would have the
chance to do so. If Peter also has and had no choice about whether he would
freely deny Jesus if given the chance, applying the closure principle leads to
the conclusion that Peter has no choice about whether he denies Jesus, and
so he does not freely deny Jesus, contrary to our initial hypothesis. IS
The standard Molinist reply is to distinguish causal from counterfactual
power. Molinists admit that we have no causal power over true counterfactuals of freedom about us. We do not cause any of them that are true to be
true, even those that are fulfilled. The main reason for maintaining this is
that in the "moment" in which God has middle knowledge (i.e. logically
prior to any of his free decrees), there are no creatures at all, and so we can
hardly cause any counterfactuals of freedom to be true. And, of course,
prior to God's decrees none of the antecedents are true. Molinists do not
allow for the possibility of backwards causation, primarily I think because
it would violate their account of providence. Even if backwards causation
were logically possible, those counterfactuals about us (or our essences)
which are true would have been true even if we had never existed. 19 But
then if God actualizes their antecedents and (as Molinists also admit) we
do not have and never had any causal control over this, and counterfactuals of freedom obey modus ponens, it follows from the closure principle that
we have no causal control over the free actions specified in the consequents
of these conditionals. But since Molinists think we do have causal control
over our free actions, they must deny the closure principle. Events under
our causal control (viz. our free acts) can be the deductive consequences of
states of affairs that are not under our causal control. At the time of his
denial(s), Peter lacked causal power over both the true counterfactual
about him and God's actualization of its antecedent, but he had the causal
power to negate or not posit its consequent. In this way, a Molinist can
undercut an argument that claims that if God has middle knowledge, none
of our actions are free.
Though Molinists deny that we have causal power over true counterfactuals of freedom about us, they say that we do have counterfactual power
over them. We have the power to act in such a way that, had we so acted, a
true counterfactual of freedom about us would have been false, and God
would not have believed what he in fact believed. If this is what is meant
by saying that their truth-values are "up to us", there is an innocuous sense
in which a Molinist must accept a version of the closure principle. But then
she can evade the conclusion that middle knowledge robs us of freedom
by denying the premiss that the truth-values of the counterfactuals are not
up to us in that sense.

Molinism and compatibilism
My aim here is not to defend these standard Molinist replies. Rather, supposing for the sake of argument that Molinists can dispose of anti-Molinist
arguments in the above fashion, I wish to consider where that leaves
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Molinists with respect to the Consequence ArgumenFo While they cannot
deny that their reply to anti-Molinist arguments is structurally similar to
the compatibilist's reply to the Consequence Argument, they will deny that
they do or must reject the Consequence Argument. Is this plausible?
There could be a difference between anti-Molinist arguments and the
Consequence Argument if rule Beta, or whatever closure principle is used,
were different in the two cases. Beta might be worded the same way in
each, but we might have different interpretations of what it means to have
"no choice" about a truth or to be "unable to render false" a proposition,
and so have different interpretations of the N-operator. There are, as we
have seen, at least two different interpretations of N. But, as we have also
seen, Molinists (like compatibilists) will say that Beta is invalid on the
strong causal interpretation, while it is valid on the weak counterfactual
interpretation.21 To that extent at least, the Molinist and compatibilist replies
to these arguments are genuinely on all fours; these anti-Molinist arguments and the Consequence Argument are either both invalid or both valid.
To say that the Consequence Argument is sound, it seems that the
Molinist must be able to say that we have no choice in the weak sense
about the past or laws of nature, while we do have a choice in the weak
sense about true counterfactuals of freedom about us. For the
Consequence Argument to be unsound, though Beta is valid, it must be the
case that we have counterfactual power over the past or laws of nature.
That of course is precisely what a compatibilist does say. Whenever we act
freely there is something we could have done or had the power to do such
that, if we had done it, the past or laws would have been different. If
Molinists thought that or were committed to it, they would (have to) reject
the Consequence Argument.
One argument for a commitment to it is the following. If we lacked
counterfactual power over true counterfactuals of freedom about us, we
would have counterfactual power over their antecedents, and so have
counterfactual power over the past or laws of nature, given that these are
part of the complete circumstances in which we act. Let me explain.
Suppose I (freely) do A in circumstances C. Then C D~ A is true, assuming (a A (3) ::::J (a D~ (3). Presumably, if I lack counterfactual power over C
D~ A, this means that C D~ A would still have been true if I had
refrained from doing A. So - A 0 - (C D~ A). Since counterfactuals obey
modus tollens and ((</> D-1jJ) A ((</> A 1jJ) D~ x)::::J </> D-X) is valid, -A D~ (C
D-A) is true only if -A D~- C is true. 22 But this argument won't work,
for Molinists think that we do have counterfactual power over true counterfactuals about US.23
Instead of saying that whenever we act freely we have counterfactual
power over the past or laws, Molinists in fact want to say that our working
assumption should be that we lack any such power. Molinists will say that
they have libertarian intuitions, and in fact the very same intuitions as any
libertarian has when it comes to the Consequence Argument. The past history of the world and laws of nature have a different status or fixity than
do true counterfactuals of freedom about us. The latter "just feel different".
Put another way, Molinists don't have the intuition that counterfactuals of
freedom are imposed or foisted upon us in such a way that they are free-
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dom-cancelling, while they do think that the determination of our actions
via the conjunction of the past and laws of nature would rob us of freedom.
To be more precise, the past history of the world and laws of nature are
things we have no power (causal or counterfactual) over,24 and our lack of
power over them would, given determinism, be transmitted through
causal chains in such a way that our actions would be outside our control,
and so not be done freely. So, while Molinists think it is plausible to maintain that we have counterfactual power over true counterfactuals of freedom about us, they (along with their libertarian colleagues) want to say
that the compatibilist's reply to the Consequence Argument, viz. giving us
counterfactual power over the past or laws, is implausible. Most libertarians who aren't Molinists cannot see how any counterfactuals of freedom
could be true. This is the familiar "grounding" objection to Molinism. But,
Molinists will suggest, most of these libertarians (with the exception of
Hasker e.g.) would probably say that if any were true, their truth would
not rob us of our freedom, whereas all libertarians will say that if determinism were true, we would not be free. In other words, Molinists will insist
that there is nothing inconsistent or even implausible about their acceptance of the Consequence Argument. 25
This is a nice story, and Molinists must, I think, tell us something like it
if they are to be consistent. But does it really work? I am less than confident
that it does. For a start, it seems to me that the most common libertarian
replies to compatibilist criticisms of the Consequence Argument are simply
not open to Molinists. 26
Compatibilists, as we've seen, either deny the validity of Beta, given the
strong interpretation of "no choice", or they deny one of the premisses of
the Argument, given the weak interpretation. Libertarians have found
these replies inadequate. Non-Molinist incompatibilists accept the validity
of Beta on the strong reading. 27 Why have they done this? Presumably
because this is what allows the incompatibilist to say that if I could have
done other than raise my arm at t, i.e. if I could have caused my arm not to
raise, and my arm's raising at t was determined by the past and laws of
nature, then I could in the strong sense have rendered false the conjunction
of the past and laws of nature. But since the latter cannot be done, I couldn't have done otherwise in the strong sense. In other words, the
Consequence Argument purports to show that we couldn't have done otherwise in the strong sense if determinism were true. If determinism were
true and compatible with our freedom to do otherwise in the strong sense,
I would have the power to act differently even though any world at which
I do act differently differs from the actual world with respect to something
(viz. the past and laws) that is not up to me in the strong sense. The usual
libertarian intuition is that I can do otherwise in the strong sense only if I
do so at a world which differs only with respect to what is up to me in the
strong sense. In other words, it seems that non-Molinist incompatibilists
accept the validity of Beta in the strong sense precisely because they think
that we would not be the ultimate source of any of our actions lmder determinism. 28 What I think bothers these incompatibilist libertarians the most
about compatibilism is not the idea that under determinism the past or
laws would be in control of us, but that ultimate control would not reside
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in us. Yet Molinists, as we have seen, must reject the validity of Beta on the
strong interpretation of "no choice". And so this defence of the
Consequence Argument, or criticism of a standard compatibilist reply to it,
is not open to them.
By the same token, says the anti-Molimst, if I cannot in the strong sense
render false the conjunction of C and "If in C I would raise my arm at t",
and my arm's raising at t is determined (not necessarily causally) by the
truth of that counterfactual and God's actualization of C, then I couldn't in
the strong sense have rendered false my arm's raising at t. In other words,
the anti-Molinist argument purports to show that I couldn't have done otherwise in the strong sense if God has middle knowledge. It seems to me
that what bothers anti-Molinist libertarians (whether or not they are proponents of divine foreknowledge) the most about middle knowledge is the
idea that if God has it, we lose the power to be the ultimate source or spring
of any of our actions. The source may not reside in God (at least directly)
insofar as God would have no control over the truth-values of any counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, but the intuition is that the source would
not reside in us.
Compatibilists say that if I had done otherwise than raise my arm at t,
some true proposition about the past or some law of nature would have
been falsified, though my act itself would neither have been nor caused a
past-altering or law-breaking event. A compatibilist who thinks that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise must say that we have counterfactual power over the past or the laws. Libertarians think this is implausible;
it is not the sense of "having a choice" or "being able to render false" which
is relevant to the Consequence Argument; it is simply too weak. Why have
they thought this? Presumably because they think it does not imply that
we would have any responsibility for the past or laws being different,29
Compatibilists of course will admit this in the strong causal sense of
"responsibility". In fact, it seems that they must. If determinism is true and
I had done otherwise, either different laws (together with the same remote
past) or a different remote past (together with the same laws) would have
entailed my doing otherwise. A difference in the laws or remote past would
have been a causal antecedent of my doing otherwise, and so my act itself
would not have caused or been a past-altering or law-breaking event. This
is presumably what allows the compatibilist to avoid the charge that the
weak sense of "having a choice" collapses into the strong sense.
Libertarians find the compatibilist's sense of "having a choice" about the
laws or remote past inadequate because they have the intuition that the
actuality of a world in which I do otherwise must be the direct result of my
doing otherwise. If this must be understood causally, compatibilists (as
well as Molinists) cannot accept it. If, on the other hand, it is understood as
mere counterfactual power, libertarians thirlk it is too weak to ground genuine responsibility for our actions under determinism.
Molinists face a parallel line of objection. They deny that we have any
causal power over true counterfactuals of freedom about us, though we do
have counterfactual power over them. Critics find this implausible, presumably because they think this weak sense of our having a choice about
counterfactuals of freedom about us does not imply that we would have
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any responsibility for them being different. In particular here, under
Molinism it is not the case that God is merely some passive observer who
has to wait and see what will happen. While he is a passive observer in the
sense that he has no control over the truth-values of the counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom which happened to be true, everything that actually
happens in the world is the result (deductive consequence) of his complete
creative act of will in the light of middle knowledge. The Molinist account
of providence demands this. And so it looks like the order or direction of
providence, i.e. the explanation of how it works, under Molinism runs parallel to the order or direction of explanation under determinism. 30
If we're free, it is a consequence of both determinism and Molinism that
there are true back-tracking counterfactuals. Suppose I raise my arm in circumstances C. The compatibilist will say that if I had refrained from raising
my arm, the circumstances (remote past or laws) would have been different. The Molinist too will say that complete circumstances C would have
been different in some way. If no back-tracking counterfactuals are true,
there is trouble all around. 31 But that there are true back-tracking counterfactuals here cannot be sufficient for having counterfactual power over
counterfactuals of freedom about us if we do not have counterfactual
power over the past or laws. I think we would usually want to say that to
get to counterfactual power here we not only need true back-tracking
counterfactuals, but (at least) power over the antecedent (i.e. my refraining
from arm raising) as well. Incompatibilists will say that if the back-tracker
in the case of determinism is true, the "can do otherwise" claim is false. But
if that is right, how can I lack power over the antecedent in that case and
yet have power over it in the Molinist case when they are the very same
antecedent?32 So, how can a Molinist plausibly deny that I have power over
the antecedent in the case of counterfactuals involving a different past or
different laws? It cannot be because of a commitment to rule Beta in the
strong sense. But if we have the weak sense in mind, it looks like mere
assertion on the Molinist's part to tell us that it is implausible to think that
we have counterfactual power over the past or laws.
A common libertarian intuition is that freedom to do otherwise requires
that it is logically possible for me to do otherwise given exactly the same circumstances (including the past and laws of nature) which actually obtain.
And it is presumably for this reason that incompatibilists think that we have
no choice about the past or laws in both the strong and weak senses, and so
N (H /\ L) in the simplified Consequence Argument is true either way.
Compatibilists must of course reject this. And Molinists must reject it too.
They must deny that if I freely do A in complete circumstances C, I have the
power to bring it about that (-A /\ C). Consider, e.g., the case of prophecy.
By hypothesis Peter freely denies Jesus. He does this under circumstances
C, circumstances which include Jesus's prophecy that Peter will (freely)
deny him. Does Peter have the power to bring it about that he not deny
Jesus and yet C obtain? No. So, Molinists must deny the above requirement
for freedom if C is complete. Whatever precisely it means to have the power
to bring it about that (-A /\ C) or "to do otherwise in the circumstances", it
surely implies -A 0- C. Given Lewis's semantics, -A 0- C is equivalent to
- (-AO---" -C). The latter, however, is the contradictory of ~A 0---.. -C (i.e.
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having counterfactual power over C). So, if one accepts the above necessary
condition for free action, together with Lewis's definition of 0-+, our acting
freely implies lacking counterfactual power over the (complete) circumstances in which we act, and so our having counterfactual power over the
circumstances implies that we do not act freely. It is not surprising that
compatibilists and Molinists reject that requirement for freedom. 33 It is not
surprising that those who accept it are incompatibilists (not only on determinism and freedom but on divine foreknowledge and freedom) and antiMolinists. 34 Once again, it is hard to see that Molinists have the very same
intuitions as any libertarian has with respect to the Consequence
Argument. 35
Molinists may, however, have some room to maneuver here. For example, why can't they say that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise
given exactly the same causal history of the world up to the time of my
action? That is surely a familiar libertarian intuition. While there is a parallel between the order or direction of explanation under determinism and
the Molinist account of providence, there is at least one key difference
between them. Compatibilism allows for, though it need not require, the
causation of our free acts by antecedent conditions not under our causal
control. For Molinists, counterfactuals of freedom and God's actualization
of certain of their antecedents do not (cannot) cause our free actions. 36 Since
counterfactuals of freedom are only contingently true, the complete circumstances specified in their antecedents are not causally (or logically) sufficient for the actions specified in their consequents. So, why can't a
Molinist say, along with other incompatibilists, that it is implausible to
suppose that it is ever up to us in any sense that the actual world is one in
which certain past events have occurred and certain laws of nature are
operative? In other words, why can't they say that it is plausible to suppose that the remote past and laws of nature are part of the causal history
of the world up to the time of our actions and for this reason are fixed, i.e.
outside even our counterfactual control, while counterfactuals of freedom
are under our counterfactual control?
Certain compatibilists, viz. those who hold a regularity account of laws,
will surely reject the suggestion that laws of nature are counterfactually
independent of our actions. For example, if physical impossibility is simply
omnitemporal falsity, what the laws are does depend counterfactually on
what we do. But why think that a Molinist must accept such a weak conception of the laws? There certainly does not appear to be anything incoherent
about a stronger conception of the laws. And so it seems possible, and
arguably plausible, for a Molinist to think that while laws of nature place
serious constraints on our abilities, and so are counterfactually independent
of what we do, counterfactuals of freedom about us do not limit our abilities and their truth-values are counterfactually dependent on what we do.
Molinists are likely to insist that there is an analytic connection between
my doing otherwise and the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom
about me. Suppose I do A in C, and so (assuming strong centering) C 0-+
A is true. Everyone agrees that (C 0-+ A) :J - (C 1\ -A). So, if I refrained
from doing A in C, that would entail the falsity of a true counterfactual of
freedom about me. Of course, under determinism my doing otherwise
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would also entail that the past or laws were different, and so in that sense
there would seem to be an "analytic" connection between my doing otherwise and the past or laws. But is it really plausible to think that the past or
laws are counterfactually dependent on my actions?
A Molinist might suggest that bringing essentially omniscient God into
the picture makes a difference here. An omniscient God's cognitive states
are equivalent to their content, and necessarily so if God is essentially
omniscient. In that case, God's cognitive states are "strongly" or "directly"
counterfactually dependent on our actions. 37 Perhaps a Molinist might then
doubt or deny the plausibility of thinking this about remote past states of
the world and laws of nature?
This suggestion might be taken to mean that while remote states of the
world and laws of nature are "hard" facts about the past, God's cognitive
states are "soft" facts about the past (to use the Ockhamist terminology). If
there are any hard facts about the past at all, the Consequence Argument is
surely concerned with what are hard facts about the past. Put in this way,
the issue between compatibilists and incompatibilists is whether indisputably hard facts about the past are fixed, i.e. outside our control in every
sense. Since compatibilists and Molinists admit that fixity in the sense of
lacking counterfactual power is closed under entailment, if the Molinist
can say that it is plausible to think that the past and laws are fixed in that
sense, but counterfactuals of freedom about us are not, this would provide
a basis for accepting the Consequence Argument but rejecting antiMolinist arguments.
But does this really work? One problem here is that Molinists appear to
accept the idea that God's beliefs (about which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true and about what we will as a matter of fact do) are hard
facts about the past. They are hard facts about the past in the sense that they
are genuinely and strictly about the past; they are temporally non-relational facts about the times at which they are held; they are "accidentally (temporally) necessary" at the time of our actions. If God's beliefs were soft
facts about the past, as they are for Ockhamists, it would seem easier to
drive a wedge between the Consequence Argument and anti-Molinist
arguments (and similarly arguments for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge with our freedom). That is, it would seem plausible to deny the
fixity of the past premiss in the latter arguments, but accept it in the former. Alternatively, if all hard facts about the past are fixed, but God's
beliefs aren't hard facts about the past, then even if hardness, and so fixity,
are closed under entailment, there would seem to be no good reason to
think that we couldn't do otherwise than God has always believed we
would. 38 But if Molinists admit that God's beliefs are hard facts about the
past, this way of trying to break the parallel with the compatibilist's rejection of the Consequence Argument is not available. Both seem to be giving
us counterfactual power over the hard past. 39
However, there is at least one remaining move open to Molinists here. If
the (causal) history of the world is equivalent to the conjunction of hard
facts about the past, but counterfactuals of freedom are not part of the
(causal) history of the world, they aren't hard facts. This might then allow
Molinists to drive a wedge between the premisses of the Consequence
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Argument and the premisses of the anti-Molinist arguments. Alternatively,
if not all hard facts about the past are fixed, there may still be room to say
that counterfactuals of freedom (and God's beliefs based on them) may be
hard but not fixed facts, unlike the case with remote past states of the
world and laws of nature. 40
To see if this can really work, let's ask ourselves again why incompatibilists have thought that remote past states and laws are fixed (i.e. outside
our counterfactual control). I think the most likely reason is that they have
already had causal consequences. But how can we have counterfactual
power over what has already had causal consequences any more than we
can have causal power over it? William Hasker has recently claimed that it
is extremely plausible to say that a fact is part of the hard, fixed history of
the world if it has already had causal consequences!l On this basis, he then
argues that counterfactuals of freedom have already had causal consequences, and so are part of the hard, fixed history of the world. That they
have had causal consequences is indisputable from a Molinist perspective,
for the central and distinguishing feature of their account of providence is
that God has actualized this world on the basis of his middle knowledge:2
In his reply to Hasker, Thomas Flint says that Molinism precludes the
acceptance of Hasker's assumption that something which has already had
causal consequences is ipso facto a hard, fixed fact about the past. 43
According to Flint, another extremely plausible assumption is that if something which is a fact about the past would not have been a fact about the
past had I exercised my power to act in a certain way, then that something
is not a hard, fixed fact about the past. He then notes that on the basis of
discussions of a number of issues related to providence (e.g. prophecy and
retrospective prayer), Molinists have made it clear that if God has middle
knowledge, there are facts about the past which have had causal consequences but over which we do have counterfactual control. And so, assuming Molinism, there are counter-examples to Hasker's assumption.
Consider, e.g., the case of praying for things to have happened. 44
Suppose I hear that my mate's plane has been ditched in the Tasman Sea.
Early reports indicate there may be some survivors, but no details are
known yet. In such a situation, I might seriously consider asking God that
my mate has been saved. But suppose I don't pray and my mate has in fact
died. It might nevertheless have been the case that if God knew by middle
knowledge that I would pray in these circumstances, he would have
arranged things in such a way that my mate survived the crash. And if that
were so, then at the time I heard about the crash I had the power to do
something (viz. pray) such that, if I had done it, something which was a
fact about the past and already had causal consequences would not have
been a fact. And depending on the details of the case, I might even have
had counterfactual power over counterfactuals backed by laws of nature,
for perhaps if I had prayed, God would have answered the prayer by suspending a law of nature. A similar story applies in the case of prophecy. At
the time of Peter's denials of Jesus, there was something he could have
done (viz. not deny Jesus) such that, if he had done it, Jesus would not
have foretold Peter's denials (on the assumption that Jesus could not err).
Peter had counterfactual power over Jesus's prophecy, even though it
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already had occurred and had causal consequences. And so, Jesus's
prophecy, like the case of someone's death in a plane crash, was not a fixed
fact about the past.
Molinists want to say that our working assumption should be that we
lack counterfactual power over the past and laws of nature. In the absence
of some good reason for thinking that we have such power, the presumption should be that we lack it. But sometimes, e.g. in the above cases and
others, Molinists think that we do have such reasons. Grant, at least for the
sake of argument, that they have given us strong reasons for rejecting
Hasker's assumption. The big trouble here is that I find it hard to see how
Molinists can plausibly restrict the "exceptions to the rule" in such a way
as to avoid their rejection of the Consequence Argument. Making exceptions to the fixity of the past and laws of nature in certain contexts, while
accepting the fixity of the past and laws of nature in the case of the premisses of the Consequence Argument is bound to strike many as arbitrary
or ad hoc. I am not suggesting that the Molinist treatment of retrospective
prayer and prophecy, among other issues, is arbitrary, ad hoc or implausible. Rather, the difficulty is in seeing how Molinists can plausibly restrict
our counterfactual power over the past in such a way as to embrace the
Consequence Argument. On the face of it at least, our counterfactual
power over the past is potentially vast, so vast indeed that it is difficult to
see any principled way for a Molinist to avoid the conclusion that no
"hard" fact about the past is fixed.
A Molinist will no doubt agree that it is conceivable that we have counterfactual power over just about any, if not every, "hard" fact about the past,
but they will insist that there is usually no reason to think that such power
is in fact ourS.45 While I would agree that retrospective prayer, prophecy
and the like are "special" cases, I must confess that I fail to see why just
about any "hard" fact about the past could not plausibly be thought to be a
candidate for the "efficacy" of retrospective prayer e.g. We must not forget
here that the "power" we may have over the (hard) past via retrospective
prayer, etc. is strictly counterfactual; it is a power we never actually exercise.
In addition, whether or not God has ever actually suspended the laws of
nature, it is hard to see why we do not routinely have merely counteifactual
power over them. We need not confine our attention here to "exotic" cases.
Take any ostensibly hard fact about the past one pleases:6 Given Molinism,
it is difficult to see how we could have any good reason to deny that it
might not, and even would not, have been a fact about the past if we had
done otherwise than we actually do (subject of course to God's will and the
totality of his middle knowledge). We do not have middle knowledge or
access to counterfactuals of divine freedom. Given the complexity of middle knowledge, and in particular the patterns (bizarre or not) of counterfactuals (including but not restricted to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom)
that may have been true, and the inscrutability of God's purposes, it might
well be the case that we routinely have the power in question.
In reply, a Molinist may agree that for all we know we might routinely
have counterfactual power over the past or laws, but insist that this misses
their point. It is not reasonable to think that we routinely have it. For all we
know, we might not have it. For us to say reasonably that the standard com-

MOLINISM & THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT

145

patibilist replies to the Consequence Argument are implausible, and so
drive a wedge between the Consequence Argument and these antiMolinist arguments, don't we only need to say that it's not reasonable to
think that we routinely have counter factual power over the past and laws?
We don't need to deny that we have it, do we? Compatibilists are committed to saying that, for every action A I could have chosen to perform but
didn't, it's necessarily the case that, had I done A, the hard past (or the laws
of nature) would have been different. We, on the other hand, only seem
committed at best to saying that it's possibly the case that, had I done A,
God's middle knowledge would have been different in such a way that
God's creative activity would have been different, meaning that the "hard"
past (or the laws of nature) would have been different. Believing the latter
gives us no good reason to believe the formerY When you think about the
exceptions we occasionally allow for, they are all cases which involve
divine beliefs and what God might do on their basis. All the "hard" past
facts we might have counterfactual power over either are or in some way
involve God's beliefs. If an essentially omniscient God's knowledge (middle or foreknowledge) is compatible with our freedom to do otherwise,
then whenever we act freely we have the power to do something such that,
if we did it, God would not have believed what he actually did. One must
say this. Of course the corresponding story must also be told if determinism and freedom are compatible. But we don't think they are. The similarity between the compatibilist's rejection of the Consequence Argument and
our rejection of these anti-Molinist arguments is only superficial. When
you see that the exceptions we make to the fixity of the past (or laws of
nature) all involve essentially omniscient God's beliefs, it should be easier
to see how back-tracking counterfactuals involving different divine beliefs
could be true than that back-tracking counterfactuals involving a different
remote past or laws of nature could be true. But then why should anyone
think it is implausible for us to reject anti-Molinist arguments while accepting the Consequence Argument?
While I certainly think there is something to be said for this reply, I find
it less than fully satisfying. Arguably, it tells us little if anything more than
what Molinists must say if they are to be consistent in embracing the
Consequence Argument. Does it give us a very good reason to believe
what they say? Frankly, I'm not sure. It sounds like the Molinist is saying
that for all we know we might have counterfactual power over every
"hard" fact about the past (or law of nature) and we might not have it. So
let's go our way and say (so we can consistently embrace the Consequence
Argument) that we might not have it or don't usually have it (except when
it suits us in our discussions of a number of issues related to providence)!
But that's ad hoc. Perhaps that's too uncharitable. To reject the
Consequence Argument, compatibilists must say that whenever we act
freely we have counterfactual power over the past or laws. It's true that I
haven't proven that Molinists are committed to this, and so I haven't proven
that they must reject the Consequence Argument. Of course, the inability
to prove that they are so committed doesn't by itself prove that they aren't.
Molinists simply do not seem to have given us any principled way of drawing a distinction between when it's reasonable to think we have (lack)
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counterfactual power over the "hard" past or the laws and when it's not
reasonable to think we have (lack) it. In the absence of this, it seems reasonable to think that the onus is on them to tell us why it's really reasonable
for them to accept the Consequence Argument.

Conclusion
Molinists typically accept the Consequence Argument against compatibilism, but it's difficult to see that this is consistent. We've seen that antiMolinist arguments have the same logical structure as the Consequence
Argument and that the Molinist and compatibilist replies, respectively, to
these arguments are structurally similar. We've seen that the most common libertarian defences of the Consequence Argument and criticisms of
standard compatibilist replies to it aren't open to Molinists. They don't
appear to be open to non-Molinist libertarian defenders of divine foreknowledge either, and a CA-like argument can also be given against them.
It's not easy to both accept the Consequence Argument and defend
Molinism or divine (simple) foreknowledge of our free actions. But middle
knowledge and foreknowledge don't pose just the same problems for their
libertarian defenders, and it seems even trickier for Molinists to embrace
the Consequence Argument. Part of the difficulty is that Molinists appear
to accept the idea that God's past beliefs are "hard" facts about the past.
Compatibilists and Molinists both seem to be giving us counterfactual
power over the "hard" past. Compatibilists are committed to the idea that
whenever we act freely there is something we had the power to do such
that, if we had done it, the past or laws of nature would have been different. Molinists want to say that our working assumption should be that we
lack counterfactual power over the past and laws. But in their discussions
of various issues related to providence they make exceptions. They face the
problem of providing a principled way of distinguishing when we have
this power and when we don't. So far as I can tell, they haven't yet done
that in such a way that we can be confident that it's reasonable for them to
accept the Consequence Argument. 4"
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NOTES
1. See e.g. John Martin Fischer's "Introduction" to his edited collection
Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), and his The
Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), especially ch. 1.
Some have argued that compatibilists on foreknowledge and freedom should
(must) be compatibilists on determinism and freedom. See e.g. William P.
Alston, "Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human
Freedom," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1985), pp. 19-32, and
William Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1989), especially ch. 7.
2. Where appropriate, I will refer to foreknowledge-free will debates.
3. Or at least some version or close relative of it is sound. See e.g. Thomas
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P. Flint's Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1998), pp. 27-28. Flint is not, however, inclined to view it as a "proof" or
"demonstration" .
4. If this can be done, it is an interesting question whether Molinists are
forced to Ockhamism over God's past beliefs in order to deny the soundness of
arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge with our freedom. I
will briefly address this in the final section.
5. I challenge this assumption in "Molinism and Compatibilism,"
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (2000), pp. 1-23.
6. An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 16.
7. What follows is only a stylistic modification of van Inwagen's presentation on pp. 93-95 of his Essay. The N-operator can be agent- and time-indexed
(as it is in anti-Molinist arguments). While van Inwagen himself employs such
an operator elsewhere, it is (as he says) unnecessary and unduly complex to do
so here.
8. For an argument for the invalidity of Beta which does not presuppose
compatibilism, see Thomas McKay and David Johnson, "A Reconsideration of
an Argument Against Compatibilism," Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), pp. 113122. For an argument that their counterexample to Agglomeration, i.e. the principle Np A Nq ::J N (p A q), leaves the second premiss in the simplified
Consequence Argument above unscathed, see Alicia Finch and Ted A.
Warfield, "The Mind Argument and Libertarianism," Mind 107 (1998), p. 523524. If Beta is invalid, one can, following David Widerker's "On An Argument
For Incompatibilism," Analysis 47 (1987), p. 41, replace it with Beta': (Np A 0 (p
::J q» ::J Nq. This is the inference rule most commonly appealed to in arguments for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge with our freedom. Finch
and Warfield follow suit and replace the first premiss above with (1') 0 ((H A
L) ::J P). Beta' tells us that one has no choice about the logical consequences of
those truths one has no choice about. Compatibilists can be counted on to reject
Beta', given the proviso in the following paragraph of the text.
9. See e.g. David Lewis, "Are We Free To Break the Laws?" Theoria 47
(1981), pp. 113-121.
10. If one finds the use of the term 'power' (or 'control') odd or forced here,
we can speak instead of the counterfactual dependence of the past or laws on
what we now or will do. This will also apply to my subsequent discussion of
standard Molinist replies to anti-Molinist arguments.
11. In a theological context, "strong libertarianism" is libertarianism as
defined above, together with the thesis that the sum total of God's activity prior
to or simultaneous with our action cannot determine that action if it is free.
12. For further details, see e.g. Flint's Divine Providence, especially ch. 2, and
the "Introduction" to Freddoso's translation of Part IV of Molina's Concordia
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
13. See e.g. Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge, especially ch. 6, and his "A
New Anti-Molinist Argument," Religious Studies 35 (1999), pp. 291-297.
14. Compare arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge
with our freedom which appeal to the notion of temporal or accidental necessity and the idea that it is closed under implication.
15. Van Inwagen calls this rule Beta-prime in "When Is the Will Free?" in
James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 3 (Atascadero, California:
Ridgeway Publishing, 1989), pp. 399-422. As van Inwagen says, it is hard to
imagine a philosopher who accepts Beta but rejects Beta-prime.
16. In place of this, we could substitute 0 (((aD~13) A a) ::J 13), as in the
simplified Consequence Argument. This argument would then also rely on
rule Beta'.
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17. Compare van Inwagen's Consequence Argument with the following
anti-Molinist argument:

3.
4.

D «(aD--f3) A a) => (3)
D «aD--f3) => (a => f3»
N «aD--f3) => (a => f3»
N (aD--[3)

5.
6.

N (a => (3)
Na

7.

N f3

1.
2.

Consequence of Molinism
1
2, Alpha
Fixity of the truth-values of counterfactuals
of freedom
3,4 Beta
Fixity of God's actualization of the
antecedents
5,6 Beta

18. David Lewis thinks that Molinists accept the closure principle, and so he
thinks that they say that when we perform the actions specified in the consequents of fulfilled counterfactuals, i.e. those with true antecedents, we thereby
render these counterfactuals true. He then goes on to say that Molinists must
treat unfulfilled counterfactuals differently. They just are true, and that's that.
See his "Evil for Freedom's Sake?" Philosophical Papers 22 (1993), pp. 160-161.
19. One might wonder here whether we can cause any counterfactuals of
freedom about us to be false. If so, one might be able to distinguish causing any
to be true from having causal power over them. But 1 do not see how his could
be so for Molinists. For example, it seems reasonable to believe that if one can
cause a proposition p to be true, one can cause not-p to be false, and vice versa.
But then if one can cause any propositions (including counterfactuals of freedom) to be false, one can cause some to be true, contrary to the considerations
raised in the text above.
20. It's worth keeping in mind that there's a parallel and equally pressing
question of what non-Molinist libertarian proponents of divine foreknowledge
can or should say about the Consequence Argument, given that a CA-like
argument can be given against them as well:
1. N (God foreknew that 1 will do A => I will do A)
2. N (God foreknew that I will do A)
3. N (I will do A)

As before, one can substitute D (God foreknew that I will do A => I will do
A) in place of 1 and appeal to Beta'.
21. It seems that non-Molinist libertarian proponents of divine foreknowledge must also reject the strong reading of Beta if they don't want to give us
causal power over what God believed in the past.
22. See Flint's Divine Providence, pp. 146-147.
23. If one could show that when we have counterfactual power over the
past, we lack counterfactual power over true counterfactuals of freedom about
us (and so, when we have counterfactual power over true counterfactuals of
freedom about us, we lack counterfactual power over the past), this would
enable a Molinist to accept the premisses of the Consequence Argument. This
of course is different from saying that lacking counterfactual power over counterfactuals of freedom implies having counterfactual power over the past. But
we cannot derive the former from the latter, and it is hard, if not impossible, to
see how we could justify the former. Moreover, Molinists in fact think that
there are counterexamples to it.
24. This comes with a very important qualification, to be discussed shortly.
As a matter of fact, Molinists do allow for counterfactual power over the past
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or laws on at least some occasions. Whether they can plausibly restrict this
power in a non-arbitrary, non ad hoc way, and so avoid rejecting the
Consequence Argument, remains to be seen.
25. The above is based heavily on Tom Flint's initial reaction to the challenge posed in this paper.
26. It's equally doubtful that they're really open to most non-Molinist libertarian proponents of divine foreknowledge.
27. This is true of at least those libertarians who aren't proponents of divine
foreknowledge. It is also true of hard determinists.
28. See Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), pp. 75-76. Again, this is true of at least those libertarians who aren't proponents of divine foreknowledge.
29. Ibid., p. 76.
30. This is one place where middle knowledge seems to pose a more serious (or at least different) problem than foreknowledge.
31. Though David Lewis, e.g., denies that if I nad done otherwise than I
actually do, all of past history would have been different, he thinks there
would have been some difference in the past. The recent past would have been
different insofar as there would have been a small divergence miracle shortly
before I did otherwise, in which case the laws would have been different. So
there is a clear sense in which Lewis admits that some back-tracking counterfactuals are true.
32. Here's one reply, due to an anonymous referee. The key idea here is
that we are talking about two different contexts, even though it is the "same
antecedent". So, if doing some act would require the past to be different from
what it actually was, the agent arguably cannot do the act; but if doing that
same act would require some conditional of freedom which is in fact true to be
false, this need not according to the Molinist entail that the agent cannot do the
act in question. In other words, there are two different contexts implying two
different necessary conditions of performing the act, which have two different
implications about the ability to do the act in question.
While I agree that an evaluation of counterfactuals is context-dependent, the
issue here is precisely whether or on what plausible basis a Molinist can consistently embrace the Consequence Argument. The above strikes me as just
another way of asserting what needs to be shown.
33. Molinists must also reject Lewis's semantics for the "might" counterfactual. Consider, e.g., the following argument based on the assumption that his
semantics are correct. Suppose I freely do A in C. Since the circumstances left me
free, it is true to say that I might have done A in C, and true to say that I might
have done -A in C. But C O-+A is equivalent to - (C D--+-A), while C 0--+ -A is
equivalent to -(C D--+ A). So, given that both might-counterfactuals are true, it
follows that neither would-counterfactual is true, and so there is no middle
knowledge. See van Inwagen's "Against Middle Knowledge," in Peter A.
French, et al. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XXI (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp. 225-236, and Hasker's God, Time, and
Knowledge, p. 28. Is it that easy to refute Molinism? Van Inwagen seems to think
so. If Hasker really believed it, it would be harder to explain his repeated efforts
to construct new and improved anti-Molinist arguments. Molinists are, I believe,
willing to accept Conditional Excluded Middle, at least when it comes to counterfactuals of freedom with complete antecedents. If one does accept CEM, given
Lewis's definition of 0--+, a "might" counterfactual implies the corresponding
"would"; and since a "would" implies the corresponding "might" (except when
the antecedent is impossible) for both Lewis and Stalnaker, the result is that a
"might" is equivalent to the corresponding "would" (except in the vacuous
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case). This is a bizarre result. So, if one has good reason to accept CEM, one has
good reason to reject Lewis's definition of the "might" counterfactual.
34. These anti-Molinist libertarians must reject strong centering: (a A ~) =:l
aD-- [3. Otherwise, together with Lewis's definition of 0--, there is big trouble.
(a A [3) and (a 0-- -[3) are an inconsistent pair, in which case either it cannot be
a requirement for being free to do [3 given a that I might do [3 and I might not
do [3 (where "might" is interpreted as 0-+), or nothing we actually do is ever
done freely.
35. And the same seems to apply to most non-Molinist libertarian proponents of divine foreknowledge.
36. Molinists say that God's foreknowledge is causally impotent. It comes
too late in the order of providence to be a cause of anything. But is it plausible
to suppose that God's middle knowledge is causally impotent? Not if that is
taken to mean that it has not had causal effects in the world. But whether
Molinists are committed to seeing the objects of middle knowledge as part of
the history of the world is controversial.
37. While critics will no doubt admit that it follows from God's essential
omniscience that if I did otherwise, God would always have believed that I
would do otherwise, they will (following Nelson Pike e.g.) question how we
get from this to having counterfactual power over God's past beliefs. They will,
in other words, doubt or deny that we could have done otherwise given what
God in fact believed.
38. The Ockhamist ploy suggested in this paragraph isn't really that simple. For example, soft (i.e. temporally relational) facts might still be fixed (i.e.
outside our control).
39. An anonymous referee has complained that Molina and his followers
need not accept (if they do) the idea that God's beliefs are hard facts, that doing
so is (given God's essential omniscience) in fact inconsistent with the Molinist
claim that we have counterfactual power over conditionals of freedom about
us. As a matter of fact, Molinists aren't fond of the hard / soft fact distinction or
terminology. Whether they accept it depends largely on what is meant by it
and the reason for which it is invoked. See e.g. Freddoso's "Introduction", pp.
44-46 and 57-61. If hard facts are counterfactually independent of what we do
(at later times), then of course God's middle knowledge and beliefs about what
we'll do aren't hard facts about the past.
40. Alternatively, if all hard facts are fixed, but counterfactuals of freedom
(and God's beliefs based on them and his decrees) aren't fixed, they aren't
hard. In that case it doesn't appear that Molinism differs from Ochamism over
God's past beliefs.
41. "A New Anti-Molinist Argument," p. 294.
42. Hasker's point is that divine middle knowledge, unlike foreknowledge,
is not causally impotent; it is an integral part of the causal process that has
made the world what it is. The question of the status of counterfactuals of freedom is a different question than the question of the status of God's past beliefs
about the future.
43. "A New Anti-Anti-Molinist Argument," Religious Studies 35 (1999), pp.
299-305.
44. See Flint's Divine Providence, ch. 11.
45. Tom Flint suggested this reply.
46. For example, that Abraham once existed, that there was once a war
between the Spartans and Athenians, that a colony of carpenter ants moved
into someone's backyard last week, etc. See Alvin Plantinga's "On Ockham's
Way Out," Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986), pp. 235-269.
47. To block a commitment to the former, Molinists would have to say it's
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possibly the case that, if I had done A, God's middle knowledge would been
different, but either God's creative activity wouldn't have been different or, if it
would have been different, the "hard" past (or the laws of nature) wouldn't
have been different.
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